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The Labor Injunction and
The Refusal to Cross
Another Union's Picket Line
Roger L Abrams*
Courts have recently confronted the issue of whether the no-strike injunc-
tion made available by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets should apply to
refusals by members of a nonstriking union to cross the picket line of a
legitimately striking union. Some jurisdictions have distinguished the
refusal-to-cross from Boys Markets on the absence of an underlying con-
tractual dispute. Others have held that the refusal was a breach of the
bargaining agreement's no-strike clause and therefore enjoinable. The
author suggests that neither approach is consistent with the equitable
underpinnings of Boys Markets. He proposes an alternative which would
assure representation of the important public and private interests involved
in the dispute.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION in Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 770' has regenerated the dormant judicial
adventure of injunctive intervention into labor disputes. Among
the most troubling post-Boys Markets developments has been the
simplistic application of that case to the refusal of members of one
union, bound by a no-strike pledge, to cross the legal picket line of
another union. The federal courts have not enunciated a fully satis-
factory rationale for granting or refusing injunctive relief in such a
situation. Rather, they have resorted to a monocular application of
the Boys Markets doctrine, inconsistent with the broad interest-
balancing mandated both by general equitable considerations and
pragmatic labor policy. Because of the recurring nature of the prob-
lem and its importance in the industrial setting, the issue deserves
careful analysis, with an emphasis on seeking a judicial strategy that
would promote multi-faceted national labor goals. Before the Su-
preme Court addresses the issue,2 a full discussion is warranted.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School.
B.A., Cornell, 1967; J.D., Harvard, 1970. Member of the Massachusetts and Federal
Bars.
1. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2. The Court has recently granted certiorari to a Second Circuit decision rais-
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
All courts which have dealt with the refusal-to-cross situation
have agreed that the judicial response is controlled by Boys Markets.3
However, they have not agreed what Boys Markets mandates for
this situation, nor have they demonstrated a clear understanding of
what that case sought to accomplish. The Supreme Court in Boys
Markets was trying to work its way out of a self-created dilemma.
In 1962, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,4 the Court, finding in
the barren phrases of section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Acte no implied congressional intent to repeal partially the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,6 ruled that federal courts could not enjoin
strikes carried out in violation of contractual no-strike promises.
Subsequently in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735,7 the Court allowed
ing the issue. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d 1207
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 20, 1975) (No. 75-339).
Five other petitions have been filed seeking review of this issue during the 1975-
76 Term. Three of these remain docketed: Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typo-
graphical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975)(No. 75-565); Valmae Indus. v. Food Handlers
Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280
(U.S. Oct. 31, 1975)(No. 75-647); Hyster Co. v. Independent Mach. Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89
(7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hyster Co. v. Employees Ass'n, 44
U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-524). The other two petitions were re-
cently denied: Island Creek Coal Co. v. Local 998, UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (Oct. 6, 1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (Oct. 6,
1975).
3. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d
1207, 1208-09 (2d Cir. 1975); Valmac Indus. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d
263, 265-66 (8th Cir. 1975). But cf. Hyster Co. v. Independent Mach. Ass'n, 519
F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
5. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
Labor-Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970). The operative provision of that Act, section
4, prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions against workers refusing to perform
work:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See generally the Court's discussion of the history and pur-
poses of Norris-LaGuardia in Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 251.
7. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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removal to federal court of state court suits brought to obtain specific
enforcement of contractual no-strike clauses. The Court reserved
the question whether injunctions available in a state forum would
have to be dissolved upon removal and, therefore, whether Sinclair
would have to be reconsidered. But it was inevitable that the prob-
lem would have to be confronted sometime.8 That sometime was
Boys Markets.
If Sinclair was still good law, reasoned the Boys Markets Court,
then an existing state remedy, the anti-strike injunction, 9 would be
displaced. Contrary to "clearly expressed congressional policy,"
the pre-existing jurisdiction of state courts would be "encroached
upon" rather than "supplemented," ' and federal removal jurisdic-
tion transmuted into a tool for rampant forum-shopping threatening
to "effect a wholesale dislocation in the allocation of judicial business
between the state and federal courts."" The Court determined to
overrule Sinclair, proffering various reasons. First of all, the Court
posited "devastating implications for the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable
remedies were not available": 12 "Any incentive for employers to
enter into [arbitration clauses] is necessarily dissipated if the princi-
pal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation
can be enforced is eliminated."' 3 Damages were "no substitute for an
immediate halt to an illegal strike" and would only aggravate the
labor dispute and delay its early resolution. 4  Moreover, the Court
argued, even if employers would accept the arbitration clause "quo"
without a specifically enforceable no-strike clause "quid," the "ef-
fectiveness" of arbitration agreements would be "greatly reduced"
without injunctive relief:
Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to
provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of in-
8. Three concurring Justices in Avco expressly stated that Sinclair Refining
should be reconsidered "upon an appropriate future occasion." Id. at 562 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., McCarroll v. Los Angeles Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
10. 398 U.S. at 245.
11. Id. at 247.
1'2. Id
13. Id. at 248. But see note 146 infra.
14. 398 U.S. at 248. It might be suggested that by this reference the Court was
determining that damages are always an inadequate remedy. See, e.g., Contractors
Ass'n v. Highway Workers Local 158, 86 L.R.R.M. 2861, 2863 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
The Court's later statement that injunctive relief would not be granted in every
instance, 398 U.S. at 254, and its direction to trial courts to determine whether
equitable considerations mandate relief indicate that the Court's earlier reference
was puffed argument.
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dustrial disputes without resort to strikes, lock-outs, or
other self-help measures. This basic purpose is obviously
largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective remedy
for those tactics that arbitration is designed to obviate.
15
Addressing the seemingly absolute terms of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act ("no court of the United States . .. shall have jurisdiction
to issue any .. . injunction .. . ,16), the Court found "harmoniz-
ing" and "accommodation" to be in order. Since pre-Norris-
LaGuardia labor conditions and attendant abuses by the federal
judiciary no longer presented a problem to a mature labor system
and since settlement of labor disputes through arbitration had be-
come a central component of federal labor policy, a "narrow" excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was appropriate.1 7 An injunction
could issue against a striking union if 1) the collective bargaining
agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision; 2) the strike
were over a dispute which the parties had promised to resolve
through arbitration; 3) the normal equitable prerequisites for an
injunction (e.g., threatened irreparable injury, more harm resulting
from denial than issuance of the injunction, absence of an adequate
remedy at law) were satisfied.'
For the most part, courts have had little difficulty applying the
Boys Markets standard to requests for injunctive relief against
strikes called to pressure employer concessions on disputes which
parties had agreed would be resolved through the "therapeutic"' 9
"regime of peaceful settlement., 20 The reported decisions indicate
that specific enforcement of no-strike and arbitration promises is
15. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
17. 398 U.S. at 253.
18. Id. at 254. As the Court itself recognizes, these guidelines were those sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Sinclair Refining, 370 U.S. at 228.
The Boys Markets decision has supplied abundant grist for the commentator mill.
See, e.g., Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets
Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215; Markson, The End of an Experiment in Arbitral
Supremacy: The Death of Sinclair, 21 LABOR L.J. 645 (1970); Relias, The Developing
Law Under Boys Markets, 23 LABOR L.J. 758 (1972); Vladeck, Boys Markets and
National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. Rav. 93 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 30, 192 (1970); Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and
the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972); Note, Giving Strength
to the No-Strike Clause: Accommodation to Allow Federal Injunctions, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 526 (1971); Note, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79
YALE L.J. 1593 (1970).
19. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568
(1960).
20. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
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willingly granted.2 ' One Boys Markets interstice, the application of
the Steelworkers Trilogy presumption of arbitrability22 to the Boys
Markets situation, caused some judicial inconsistency.23 But the
Supreme Court definitively responded in Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers24 by mandating application of the presump-
tion to Boys Markets situations.
II. THE JUDICIAL TRACK-RECORD
The other major decisional conflict concerning the application of
Boys Markets stems from the situation at hand, the failure or refusal
of members of one union to cross the picket line of another union
despite a contractual promise not to strike. In most reported in-
stances, the union has directed or at least ratified the refusal-to-
21. Research of reported decisions indicates that Boys Markets injunctions have
been granted in 10 of the 11 circuits: Hilton Int'l. Co. v. Asociasion de Empleados de
Casino de Puerto Rico, 324 F. Supp. 492 (D.P.R. 1971); New York News, Inc. v.
New York Typographical Union No. 6, 374 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); General
Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Local 542, Operating Engineers, 371 F. Supp. 1130
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters, 81 L.R.R.M. 2205 (M.D.N.C.),
injunction dissolved, 353 F. Supp. 869 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Communications Workers Local 6222, 343 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Tenn. 1971);
Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1972); Peabody
Coal Mine v. Local 7869, UMW, 360 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Ark. 1973); Stearns-Roger
Corp. v. Machine Erectors Local 1182, 77 L.R.R.M. 2776 (D. Ariz. 1971); Holland
Constr. Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 101, 315 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1970).
The decision has also been cited in support of various and sundry propositions
not directly related to labor disputes. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stare decisis); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
128 (1970) (Harlan, J.) (stare decisis); United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem.
Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1972) (accommodation between conflicting
statutes); Harwin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Fahy, J.,
concurring) (accommodation between conflicting statutes); Bradshaw v. United
States, 443 F.2d 759, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (inconclusiveness of congressional silence);
Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (inconclusiveness of congressional
silence). See also Note, 16 VILL. L. REV. 176, 178-80 (1971).
Whether the injunctive relief has necessarily resulted in the projected "regime of
peaceful settlement" is another question, however. There is some evidence to indi-
cate that the injunction has created more dissension and discord than it has obviated,
particularly in certain industries such as coal-mining. Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1975, at 38, col. 2. A definitive study of the impact of the Boys Markets injunction on
the labor relations scene has yet to be written.
22. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 583 (1960).
23. Compare Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers Local
6222, 454 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1971), with Standard Food Prods. Corp. v. Brandenburg,
436 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1970).
24. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
25. At the same time the Court, directing that a strike over a safety dispute be
enjoined, implied a no-strike promise from the arbitration procedure, notwithstanding
provisions in the agreement which expressly "rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and
made null and void" all prior no-strike promises (id. at 384 n.15), and which gave a
[Vol. 26:178
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cross. Although broadly analogous to the quintessential Boys
Markets situation, the refusal-to-cross issue is much more complex.
Both private and public interests are involved which are not found in
the standard Boys Markets pattern. These new interests suggest an
altered judicial strategy. First, however, it is profitable to review
the record of the federal courts in refusal-to-cross cases since Boys
Markets. The following hypothetical fact pattern is typical of ac-
tual situations confronted by courts asked to respond to an em-
ployer's plea for an injunction compelling non-striking employees
to cross another union's picket line:
The Shipbuilding Company [hereinafter "the Company"] oper-
ates extensive shipbuilding facilities in New City and Old Town.
Essentially the same products (viz., ships) are manufactured at each
yard. Recently, the Company won a defense contract after highly
competitive bidding. Time is of the essence in the performance of
this contract, and the Company stands to lose both a large liquidated
damages award and a substantial amount of future business if it is
unable to complete the project on time.
At the New City yard, the Company employs 1000 shipbuilders,
represented by Shipbuilding Workers, Local 10. The Company has
entered into a series of collective bargainifig agreements with Local
10 over the past twenty years. The present agreement with Local 10,
which does not expire for one year, contains a no-strike provision:
"During the term of this Agreement, there shall be no strikes, work
stoppages, slowdowns, or any other interferences with or impeding
of work." In addition, it provides for mandatory arbitration of
disputes over the application or interpretation of the terms of the agree-
ment.
At the Company's Old Town facility, 100 miles to the south, the
2000 production employees are represented by Shipbuilding
Workers, Local 50. The contract between the Company and Local
50 has expired. Recently, Local 50 voted to strike the Old Town
facility and has established picket lines at that yard. In order to
publicize its strike and apply further economic pressure on the Com-
pany to reach an agreement favorable to its members, Local 50
extended its picket line to the New City yard. Members of Local 10,
under the guidance of their union officers, refused to cross Local 50's
peaceful picket line. The Company formally demanded that the
New City local cease the work stoppage, on grounds that the stop-
page violated the no-strike pledge, and offered to arbitrate immedi-
ately any dispute concerning the parties' contractual obligations.
union mine safety committee the unreviewable right to remove all mine workers
from an unsafe area. Id. at 383.
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No employees crossed the line. Alleging that the union was striking
in violation of a valid no-strike provision in a contract providing for
mandatory arbitration of disputes and that continuation of the strike
would cause irreparable injury, the Company filed suit in federal
district court seeking Boys Markets injunctive relief ordering arbi-
tration and compelling Local 10 employees to end their stoppage
and report to work.26
If the Company were to bring its suit in the Fifth Circuit,27 it
likely would leave the courthouse empty-handed. In Amstar Corp.
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,28 the first of the circuit court deci-
sions on point,29 the employer sought specific enforcement of the
union's no-strike pledge. It argued that the legality of the refusal-
to-cross depended on a disputed interpretation of the no-strike
clause, which in turn was reserved for exclusive resolution under the
provisions of the contract's arbitration clause. But the court refused
to grant the injunction. Since the refusal-to-cross itself "precipi-
tated the dispute," the stoppage of work was not "over" any under-
lying dispute.30 If it permitted the very strike to be enjoined to be
bootstrapped into an arbitrable issue sufficient, under Boys Markets,
to support a federal court injunction, the court feared it would
undermine the "vitality" of federal anti-injunction legislation since
the same argument could be made in favor of enjoining each and
every strike during the term of an agreement. 3' The facts in Amstar
26. Note that, assuming common control of labor relations at the two facilities
by the Company, Local 50's picketing at New Town is not secondary picketing,
obviating possible resort to an injunction under LMRA sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 10(1).
The hypothetical describes a situation involving two plants and one union, albeit
with different locals. Apart from the question of common situs picketing, there is no
particular reason why the hypothetical could not have involved a single plant with two
unions. See discussion at note 42 infra.
27. For example, the Company could be the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding
Co., with production and maintenance workers represented by Local 18 of the Indus-
trial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO. The collec-
tive bargaining agreement effective until March 6, 1976, contains a no-strike promise
prohibiting, inter alia, "suspension of work" and a mandatory grievance and arbi-
tration procedure covering disputes "as to the interpretation of, the application of,
or the compliance with the provisions of this Agreement." Alabama Dry Dock and
Shipbuilding Co. and Shipbuilding Workers Local 18, Labor Agreement, art. XXIV,
§ I and art. XXI, § 1 (March 2, 1973).
28. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. There were a few district court decisions prior to Amstar which refused to
grant injunctive relief in the refusal-to-cross situation. See General Cable Corp. v.
IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971); Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v.
Automotive Lodge No. 1486, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C. 1971); Simplex Wire & Cable
Co. v. IBEW Local 2208, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970).
30. 468 F.2d at 1373.
31. Id. The Court's concern with the universality of strike injunctions, if the
refusal-to-cross were enjoined, is unfounded. Unions may strike over important
issues or unimportant issues, but rarely do they strike over no issues at all. Strikes
[Vtol. 26:178
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differ in no relevant respect from the facts in the hypothetical, and
thus under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the Company's claim would
fail.
Were the Company to bring its suit in the Fourth Circuit,32
its prospects for obtaining relief would be improved greatly. In
Monongahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local 2332,33 the bargaining
agreement between the parties provided that all "claimed viola-
tions" of any of the express provisions of the agreement constituted
grievances to be settled by resorting to the specified arbitration
procedure. The agreement contained an express prohibition of any
"strike, work stoppage, slowdown, or any other interference with
or impeding of work. 34  The Fourth Circuit, viewing the union's
refusal-to-cross another union's strike line as falling clearly within
the "extremely broad and encompassing language" of the agree-
ment, held that the work stoppage was arbitrable and therefore a
Boys Markets injunction could appropriately issue pending arbitra-
tion of the contractual legality of the union's conduct. The Fifth
Circuit's fears of unbounded judicial intervention into labor disputes
and a concomitant emasculation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were
not even addressed by the Court,35 nor was the import of the absence
of a pre-strike dispute considered. As discussed previously, the
latter was the distinguishing factor from Boys Markets which had
precipitated the Fifth Circuit's apprehensions.36
called to pressure employer acquiescence over any matter arguably cognizable in
arbitration are enjoinable under Boys Markets. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). On the other hand, strikes called over disputes
which are expressly and clearly exempted from arbitration would not invite judicial
intervention. See, e.g., Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 460 F.2d
789 (9th Cir. 1972), and cases cited therein at 791. A union defendant in the latter
situation would be quick to advise the bench that, since arbitration is not a con-
tractually established alternative remedy, specifically enforcing the no-strike pledge
would not be consistent with national labor policy as pronounced in Boys Markets.
The refusal-to-cross situation stands alone as an example of a union stoppage of work
unrelated to any underlying dispute. The question remains, however, as to what is
the appropriate role of the courts in such a situation.
32. For example, the Company could be the Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co., with production and maintenance workers represented by Local 31 of the Inter-
national Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO. The
,collective bargaining agreement effective until November 13, 1975, contains a no-
strike promise prohibiting "suspension of work," and an apparently open-ended
grievance and arbitration procedure covering "complaints, disputes, or grievances."
Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. and Shipbuilding Workers Local 31, Labor
Agreement Arts. XXI, VI, VII (Nov. 13, 1972).
33. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 1210.
35. The Monongahela court failed even to cite Amstar, which at the time was
the only federal appellate decision on point.
36. The Fourth Circuit has reaffirmed the Monongahela approach. See Armco
19751
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Upon analysis, the Amstar and Monongahela decisions can be
seen as dividing on the implication of the single word "over" in the
guideposts specified in Boys Markets: "When a strike is sought to
be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no
injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that
effect., 37  Based on the premise that the refusal-to-cross the picket
line was not "over" any matter already disputed by the parties,
Boys Markets was held in Amstar to be inapposite and therefore the
arbitrability issue was not raised. The Monongahela court, ignoring
the import, if any, of the "over a grievance" language and the ab-
sence of a pre-existing dispute, found it sufficient that the strike's
legality was an arbitrable issue, therefore justifying a Boys Markets
injunction since the claimed violation of the agreement was "a
grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate."
Thus, by the end of 1973, the lines were drawn. The Mononga-
hela court had stressed arbitration as the industrial salve even at the
expense of doing "violence to a spontaneous textual reading" 38 of
Boys Markets; the Amstar court, apprehensive of judicial abroga-
tion of the right to strike, had distinguished Boys Markets and re-
fused to act at all. 39 Confronted with these disparate legal interpre-
tations and a clear choice between outcomes, the circuits have
chosen sides.
The Third Circuit, in NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive
Chauffeurs, Local 926,40 joined the Monongahela side and issued an
injunction in a refusal-to-cross situation where there was no pre-
existing contractual dispute between the parties. The contract
contained a "protection of rights clause '4 1 authorizing a concerted
refusal to cross if the picket line was primary, but the employer
Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3206 (Oct. 6, 1975); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391,
497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Wilmington Shipping Co.
v. Longshoremen's Union, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974).
37. 398 U.S. at 254, citing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228
(1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis on "does" in original; emphasis on "over"
added).
38. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186 (1941).
39. As suggested below, at the very least the court should have considered the
alternative of directing arbitration while refusing to enjoin the refusal-to-cross.
See text accompanying notes 66-69, infra.
40. 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
41. The clause provided: "It shall not be a violation of this Agreement ... in
the event an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a primary labor
dispute or refuses to go through or work behind any primary picket lines . . . at the
Employer's [NAPA Pittsburgh's] place or places of business." Id. at 322 (brackets in
original).
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contested the status of the picket line (i.e., whether it was primary
or secondary 42) and the court viewed this controversy as an arbi-
trable matter sufficient to support the Boys Markets injunction.
Amstar and its district court predecessors43 were distinguished on
the basis that they did not involve bargaining agreements contain-
ing such a protection of rights clause. This curious treatment of the
clause-i.e., as a restriction rather than an enlargement of permissi-
ble union activity-was roundly criticized by the dissent.4
Indeed, the NAPA Pittsburgh decision is noteworthy for Judge
Hunter's efforts in dissent to devise a rationale for dealing with the
refusal-to-cross situation. Judge Hunter reasoned that the typical
refusal-to-cross situation does not involve a union attempt to cir-
cumvent its arbitration undertaking by proceeding with self-help
measures which pressure an employer to forego arbitration and ac-
cede to union demands on an otherwise arbitrable issue. Based on
the premise that the pro-arbitration policy underpinnings of the Boys
Markets decision are inapposite when the work stoppage is not
called in derogation of the arbitration promise, Judge Hunter con-
cluded that injunctive relief should be denied.45
The Third Circuit has since elaborated on its criteria for issuing
injunctions in the refusal-to-cross situation:
[I]f the contract gives the union and the employees the right
to grieve and arbitrate the given dispute, that remedy must
42. The picketing union represented employees at another branch of the plaintiff
company's operations in another city. It seems clear that, assuming there was com-
mon control, the picket line would be primary as directed at the same primary em-
ployer. See, e.g., Miami Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir.
1963). Moreover, no unfair labor charge was filed with the Labor Board seeking
injunctive curtailment of the line as violative of section 8(b)(4), which fact should
have barred the company's action in the first instance. See note 57 infra.
43. See note 29 supra.
44. The dissent viewed the protection of rights clause as enlarging the union's
right to strike since it was written as an exception to the contract's general no-strike
provision. 502 F.2d at 331 n.14.
45. Id. at 333. The dissent also raises the objection that granting an in-
junction in the refusal-to-cross situation would undermine the federal policy favoring
arbitration since an employer, securely holding an injunction against his employees'
work stoppage has "every incentive to avoid and obstruct arbitration by every means"
available. Id. at 327. Only in the subsequent arbitration of the issue does he risk
loss on the merits and a renewal of the strike. Id. See Boys Markets: Developments
in the Third Circuit, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 281, 309 (1975). Supporting this theory, however,
the dissent claims that district courts cannot mitigate this delay because the contract
procedures must be allowed to run their prescribed course. To the contrary, a district
court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, can order expedited arbitration, even
eliminating a multi-step grievance procedure, perhaps by establishing an express
timetable. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 442 F.2d
246 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Machinists Lodge 143, 442 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1970). Alternatively, the court could
limit the duration of its injunction as a disincentive to employer foot-dragging.
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be pursued in preference to a work stoppage. Thus the
initial inquiry should not be whether the employer is en-
titled to an injunction, but rather, whether the underlying
dispute is one which the union and the employees could
grieve and arbitrate.46
Judge Adams dissented, rueing the fact that "by a process of at-
trition, the salutary rule established after long and sometimes bitter
struggle by the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be imperceptibly chipped
away until it has lost a substantial portion of its vitality. ' ' 7
The Seventh Circuit, disclaiming any intention to align itself with
either camp, first found the Monongahela approach more appealing
in Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW,4 but switched prefer-
ences eight months later in Hyster Co. v. Independent Machine
Association.49 In Inland Steel, the court asserted that the "principal
circumstance" required to support a Boys Markets injunction "is
that the work stoppage or strike must have been generated over an
arbitrable dispute," 50 but then ignored this requirement in dealing
with the case at hand. It found the refusal-to-cross to be an arbi-
trable matter and thus "there exists an obligation not to strike over
that dispute"; injunctive relief was in order.51 Judge Fairchild dis-
sented that Amstar accorded more with the Boys Markets principle
of "narrowly circumscribed . . . accommodation" and therefore
should be followed.52
When it next addressed the refusal-to-cross injunction issue in
Hyster, the court distinguished Inland Steel on the basis of the
breadth of the covenant to arbitrate. The clause in Inland Steel
had covered "differences . . . about matters not specifically men-
tioned in this agreement" and "any local trouble of any kind,
'
"
53
while in Hyster the clause was restricted to "[a]ll differences, dis-
putes, or controversies which arise between the Union, the Company
or any employee covered by this Agreement and the Company.,
54
Under the latter clause, the court held, a refusal-to-cross was not
46. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Local 998, UMW, 507 F.2d 650, 652 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (Oct. 6, 1975).
47. Id. at 654.
48. 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
49. 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hyster v. Em-
ployees Ass'n, 44 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 75-524).
50. 502 F.2d at 299 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. The court also considered civil contempt citations against the unions for
violating the district court's injunctive orders requiring the employees to cross the
picket line. The fines levied were substantial; in one instance a union had originally
been fined $10,000 for each day of the violation. Id. at 296.
53. Id. at 297 n.5.
54. 519 F.2d at 91.
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subject to compulsory arbitration, thus rendering Boys Markets
inapposite. Since the Supreme Court had intended to create only a
"very limited exception" to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and since
the dispute was not over a grievance the parties were bound to arbi-
trate pursuant to Amstar, injunctive relief was denied.5
On May 1, 1975, the Second Circuit, in Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers of America,56 aligned itself with Amstar and
denied relief in a refusal-to-cross situation because of the "virtual
obliteration" of the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which would
result if injunctive relief were available where the strike was "not
an attempt to circumvent arbitration machinery."5 7 Relying on the
"narrowness" of the Boys Markets holding, the Court held that the
"over a grievance" language in the controlling text mandated non-
intervention.58
Most recently, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits have joined in the fray
-on opposite sides. The Eighth Circuit, in Valmac Industries, Inc.
v. Food Handlers Local 425 9 and Associated General Contractors
v. Laborers Local 563,60 decided the same day, aligned itself with the
Monongahela court and upheld injunctions ordering non-striking
workers to cross picket lines.6' Valmac is particularly noteworthy
because the company, having obtained the desired injunction, then
refused to arbitrate the issue of the union's failure to cross. It con-
tended that the granting of the injunction "decided" the issue and
made further proceedings unnecessary. As the court correctly
pointed out, Boys Markets injunctions are themselves conditioned
upon compliance with an order to arbitrate.62 But the company's
stance clearly indicates that the granting of the injunction may not
have the totally nonpartisan effect which Boys Markets contem-
plates.63
The Sixth Circuit, reviewing Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v.
Typographical Union No. 53,64 upheld the district court's refusal to
grant an injunction in a per curiam decision following the Second
55. Id. at 92.
56. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 20,
1975) (No. 75-339).
57. Id. at 1211.
58. Id. at 1210.
59. 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S.
Oct. 31, 1975) (No. 75-647).
60. 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975).
61. Valmac Indus. Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 268
(8th Cir. 1975).
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying notes 112-18 infra.
64. 88 L.R.R.M. 2155 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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Circuit's reasoning in Buffalo Forge.65 Judge Green of the Northern
District of Ohio denied the request of the Cleveland Plain Dealer
for injunctive relief against four printing craft unions who had re-
fused to cross the picket line of the Newspaper Guild.6 6  Recogniz-
ing the "uncertain state of the law on the issue before the Court,"
Judge Green concluded that Amstar represented "the sounder view,"
consistent with the Supreme Court's narrow holding in Boys Mar-
kets.67 In the alternative, the court recognized the "potential" for
violence in crossing the picket line and, relying on 29 U.S.C. section
143,68 concluded that those employees refusing to cross, who had at
least tried to cross, were not on strike because of the "abnormally
dangerous conditions for work," i.e., going to work through the
Guild's line.69 This conclusion is troubling because the county court
of common pleas, on the first day of the strike and prior to the
federal court hearing, had enjoined all mass picketing and violence
on the picket line.70 It might be suggested that as a matter of com-
ity a federal court should not ignore the existence of a no-violence
injunction in ruling on assertions of violence on the line.7'
65. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d
1220 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975)
(No. 75-565).
66. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d
1222 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd per curiam, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 75-565).
67. Id. at 1227.
68. The statute provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions
for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a
strike under this chapter." The legislative history is mute as to what Congress
intended by this savings provision, but the Supreme Court in Gateway Coal fleshed
out the statutory bones by requiring "ascertainable, objective evidence supporting
[the] conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists." 414 U.S.
at 387. The safety hazard at issue there was an unsafe condition in a mine caused
by supervisory misfeasance. Whether a posited unsafe condition outside the work-
place falls within the statutory reference is a much more difficult question.
69. 520 F.2d at 1228.
70. Furthermore, Judge Green, while proclaiming allegiance to the Gateway
Coal standard of "ascertainable, objective evidence", 414 U.S. at 385, relied upon
the testimony of employees that "they fully believed" and "honestly believed" danger
would ensue from their crossing the line. 520 F.2d at 1229. While, as the Supreme
Court has stated in another context, "[flear may indeed prevent some from
crossing a picket line," Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306 (1974),
the district court's reliance on subjective fears and not objective conditions appears
in error. But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 89 L.R.R.M.
3118 (3d Cir. July 24, 1975), where the Gateway Coal standard is eased in the
presence of a contractual provision authorizing cessation of work in an area where
an "imminent danger" exists.
71. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 53, 90 L.R.R.M.
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Other district courts have shown a similar affinity for the Amstar
approach. The Southern District of Texas, in Carnation Co. v.
Teamsters Local 949,72 followed the controlling Fifth Circuit Amstar
approach in a suit brought not to compel employees to cross the
picket line, but rather to enjoin their union leadership from encour-
aging them to honor the line. This clever twist in employer strat-
egy, however, did not affect the outcome. Acknowledging that al-
though the refusal to cross "may constitute an issue subject to arbi-
tration, it is not the focus of the . . .strike and thus does not fit
within the narrow exception to Norris-LaGuardia established in
Boys Markets."
73
Finally, the Western District of Washington, in Stokely-Van
Camp, Inc. v. Thacker,74 followed both schools of thought in ruling
on refusals-to-cross involving separate unions and separate bargain-
ing agreements. One union, Cannery Warehousemen Local 788,
had bargained for a "protection-of-rights" clause which broadly
insulated from contractual censure employee respect of a primary
picket line sanctioned by the Local. The parties disputed whether
the stranger picket line was primary or secondary and the court,
despite treating this dispute as arbitrable, found Boys Markets
injunctive relief inappropriate.75  The "work stoppage is not de-
signed to force settlement of an arbitrable issue before [the] Em-
ployer can present its side to an arbitrator. The work stoppage,
therefore, is not the result of an arbitrable dispute . ,76 The
Amstar line of cases was cited as controlling. But the court then
proceeded to find that "Local 788 never agreed to cross all picket
lines pending arbitration," and since the refusal-to-cross constituted
"arguably legal union activity," an injunction would "impose upon
the union an additional obligation not contracted for, one that would
undermine the union's contractual position.""
On the other hand, a second union, Teamsters Local 411, had
71. One matter not raised on appeal was the failure of Judge Green to order
the parties to arbitration as distinguished from his refusal to grant an injunction
ordering nonpicketing union members to cross the line. Prior to Boys Markets, the
Supreme Court had held that a federal district court could specifically enforce an
arbitration promise at the behest of parties to the contract. Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). There is no reason why this practice should
be disturbed by Boys Markets. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
72. 86 L.R.R.M. 3012 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
73. Id. at 3013.
74. 394 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 24, 1975).
75. Id. at 718.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 718-19. The court here relied upon the analysis of NAPA Pittsburgh
in Note, 88 HAV. L. REv. 463, 467 (1975).
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bargained for a more limited "protection-of-rights" clause in its
collective agreement. This provision protected refusals-to-cross
only if the picket line was one established by employees of the
company's Burlington facility. Since the picketers in the case at
bar were admittedly strangers to the plant, the court reasoned that
compelling Local 411 to cross the line would not impose an addi-
tional noncontractual obligation. Although the court recognized
that the refusal-to-cross was not "over" an arbitrable matter, it found
that "[t]he illegality of Local 41 1's actions under the . . .agree-
ment is the overriding factor . .. that brings [this part of the case]
within the scope of Boys Markets."'78  Island Creek Coal Co. v.
Local 998, UMW,79 the most recent of the Monongahela line of
cases, was cited as precedent.
Local 411 also represented employees at the company's Mt.
Vernon facility, but there was conflicting evidence whether the
newly negotiated agreement had been executed by the parties.
Since there was no "conclusive showing of the existence of an ef-
fective collective bargaining agreement," no Boys Markets injunc-
tion could issue.80 The Stokely-Van Camp smorgasbord indicates
that a reasoned analysis of the problem is in order.8'
III. A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE OF Boys MARKETS
The judicial "track record" demonstrates a clear conflict among
the circuits.12  Although the courts have had adequate opportunity,
judicial adherents of neither school have fully thought through the
issues and their practical implications to formulate an appropriate
judicial strategy. Instead, both schools frequently have demon-
strated a willingness "to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism. '8 3 In
78. 394 F. Supp. at 720. It is, of course, not clear that Local 411 had agreed
to cross all picket lines by virtue of its no-strike clause. That determination, much
like the question whether Local 788 had a contractual right not to cross, was for the
arbitrator. By enjoining Local 411's action the court may have been imposing the
same "additional obligation" which it foreswore relative to Local 788.
79. 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3206 (Oct. 6, 1975).
80. 394 F. Supp. at 720.
81. One is reminded of Justice Jackson's frustration over the Supreme Court's
failure to reach a consistent analysis of the issues in Chenery II: "I give up. Now I
realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the
more I don't understand it'." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
82. The score is currently tied at 3 1/2-3 1/2. The Third, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits would probably grant the injunction, and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits would probably deny it. The Seventh Circuit has indicated it could go either
way. See notes 26-56 supra and accompanying text.
83. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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order to undertake a more comprehensive evaluation of the prob-
lem, in an attempt to reach a conclusion more consistent with na-
tional labor policy, it is necessary first to return to the fountain-
head of the divergent views, the Boys Markets decision. It is in-
structive to view the Court's opinion from a behavioral perspective:
What course of conduct does the Court expect 4 of parties in the in-
dustrial circumstance, who are bound by a collective bargaining
agreement containing both arbitration and no-strike clauses? What is
the preferred behavioral model?
Parties to an agreement to arbitrate are expected to comply with
their self-created procedure for resolving conflicts; a dispute argu-
ably falling within the parameters of the arbitration promise
should be brought to the arbitral forum for resolution.8 5 The subse-
quent award of the arbitrator, if within the scope of his power,
binds the parties. The union must abide by its voluntary promise
to adhere to the contractual mechanism, to grieve but not to strike
when an arguably arbitrable dispute arises during the term of the
agreement. A court, in turn, is empowered to mandate this pre-
ferred behavior pursuant to the "wholesome federal policy promoting
enforcement of dispute-settlement procedures fashioned by the
parties" by enjoining strikes employed to pressure concessions in lieu
of arbitration.
6
84. Whether the Court's expectation is justifiable and reasonable, although an
inquiry worthy of pursuit, is beside the immediate question. Boys Markets stands as
the present law. However, its mere existence does not mean that injunctions should
be issued in all sets of circumstances. Assuming Boys Markets to be a beneficial
accommodation of conflicting policies and interests, the Court must guard against
any "expansion" which becomes "the latest manifestation of the destructive potential
of any good idea carried out to its logical extreme." Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323,
399 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1993, UMW, 390 F. Supp. 497
(W.D. Pa. 1975). The parties are also expected to pursue pre-arbitration grievance
procedures in an attempt to settle the matter through mid-term negotiation. None
of the Boys Markets decisions has addressed the question whether such grievance
steps must precede the arbitration when the court enjoins strike action and sends
the parties back to their contract for private resolution. The beneficial role played
by grievance steps in the structure of industrial jurisprudence, e.g., administering the
contract, screening out minor matters, alerting management to workplace dysfunc-
tions, affording management a mechanism for control over supervision, allowing
quick resolution at low cost, does not appear apposite in a situation where union
officialdom and rank-and-file have felt so strongly about an issue that they have
bxoken the industrial peace. On the other hand, this should not preclude a federal
court, in the exercise of its equity powers under Boys Markets, from ordering full
or truncated use of pre-arbitration procedures, if the court has determined the
provision of a forum for preliminary bargaining advisable.
86. Blake Constr. Co. v. Laborers Int'l Union, 511 F.2d 324, 326-27 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Lockouts by employers in lieu of arbitration would appear to be enjoinable
under the preferred behavioral model, but no court has faced the issue, presumably
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On its face, the refusal of members of one union to cross another
union's picket line does not transgress this behavioral model. The
union has not abjured arbitration in favor of coercing the employer to
accede to its demands concerning a pre-existing dispute since by
definition there is no pre-existing dispute.87  While this facile reso-
lution of the problem has met some judicial88 and commentative
acceptance, 9 it is not totally satisfactory. Why should not the policy
initiated in Boys Markets-the avoidance of labor strife where peace-
ful alternatives are mandatory and immediately available-carry over
to this conduct as well?90
It could be argued with some force that a union which refuses
to arbitrate the question of its primary contractual obligation to work
has turned its collective back on contract procedures. Admittedly,
there may be no pre-existing dispute, but a dispute is "created" by
the union's conduct, the employer's demand, and the union's con-
tinuation of activity which, arguably, is contractually proscribed.
Adherence to a voluntarily assumed "no-strike" clause is undoubted-
ly favored national policy. Why not enforce the mutual voluntary
promises and direct the parties to the bargained-for forum for dis-
pute resolution?
A possible response might be that because the Court, in Boys
Markets, expressly stated its intent to create only a "narrow" ex-
ception to the Norris-La Guardia Act, broad application of that de-
cision would be inconsistent with this modest judicial purpose.
But how narrow is "narrow"? The Court has demonstrated in
because employers ordinarily may act to institute their managerial desires without
union acquiescence as long as the statutory requirements of good-faith bargaining
are met. Cf Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18,
471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
87. Of course, if the union uses the existence of a picket line as a windfall
circumstance to pressure the employer over pre-existing issues in dispute, Boys
Markets is operative; injunctive relief would be warranted if the other requirements
of the decision, e.g., irreparable injury, mandatory arbitration of disputes, balance
of equities, are met. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Drivers Local 500,
363 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
88. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d
1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1975) (No.
75-339).
89. Note, Injunctions-Federal Court May Enjoin Work Stoppage When Its
Legality is Arbitrable Issue, 88 HARV. L. REV. 463, 468 (1975); Comment, Boys
Markets: Developments in the Third Circuit, 48 TEMp. L.Q. 281, 309 (1975).
90. Boys Markets, of course, dealt with a strike called to pressure the employer
concerning an arbitrable matter, thus the reference to "over a grievance" in its call
to the district courts. It is not at all frivolous to suggest that limiting the application
of the policies supporting that decision in all instances to the precise fact pattern
addressed therein "is to shrivel a versatile principle to an illustrative application."
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 189 (1941).
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Gateway Coal that an expansive reading of Boys Markets is not
merely possible-it might even be anticipated.
IV. THE EQUITY EQUATION
Boys Markets freed the federal courts, in certain situations, from
the blanket proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court,
however, required that "ordinary principles of equity" be followed
in granting or refusing injunctive relief. One of those "ordinary prin-
ciples" involves judicial identification and accommodation of the
legitimate, but conflicting, interests and policies affected by the de-
cision.9' In Boys Markets, the Court recognized the private inter-
ests of voluntarism, promise-keeping, and resolution of disputes by
private expert mechanisms and the general public policy of labor
peace as the supporting structure for its approval of injunctive re-
lief. In the refusal-to-cross situation, however, the Boys Markets
equity equation is altered by the infusion of important new interests.
The legally92 striking and picketing union, though not a party to
the court's injunctive proceeding, has a legitimate interest worthy of
judicial protection of dissuading persons from dealing with the struck
employer.93  This interest parallels national labor policy. Despite
the "maturity" of the national labor relations system, 94 the strike
91. The Court has consistently followed a comprehensive weighing process in
dealing with labor issues. For example, in the context of a lockout, the Court has
noted the need to balance interests for just adjudication. The right to strike, the
Court said, "is not so absolute as to deny self-help by employers when legitimate
interests of employees and employers collide. . . The ultimate problem is the
balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests." NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543 (1964) (categorized in NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S.
272, 286 (1972), as an "accommodation between the legislative endorsement of
freedom of contract and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of
labor disputes"); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) ("adjust-
ment" of right of self-organization and right to maintain discipline). "'T]he ad-
vantages of a simple rule must be balanced against the importance of taking fair
account, in a civilized legal system, of every socially desirable factor in the final judg-
ment." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941).
92. If the picket line is illegal, e.g., involving violence or mass picketing, the
employer has recourse to various judicial methods for removing the line, or cleansing
it of illegalities. This relief may be available either under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act or under state statutes or under common law. See, e.g., Squillacote v.
Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers., 390 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Wis. 1975); note 57
supra.
93. Cf. Local 761 I.U.E. v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v. Rockaway
News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 81 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Interna-
tional Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951).
94. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
See also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966): "After all,
the labor movement has grown up and must assume ordinary responsibilities."
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and the picket line remain the generators within the collective bar-
gaining relationship. 95 Congress demonstrated its recognition of this
primary datum in designing "administrative techniques for the
peaceful resolution of industrial disputes, 9 6 and in requiring that
industrial partners bargain in "good faith" only, without compul-
sion to make concessions or reach agreement.97  Its policy was "to
allow the balance of bargaining advantage to be set by economic
power realities."" The parties in the industrial circumstance
[S]till proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has
not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect
understanding among people would lead to perfect agree-
ment among them on values. The presence of economic
weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion
by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. 99
Further, section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act broadly
protects the right to strike, "except as specifically provided for"
in the statute.100
A union exercising this protected weapon in a lawful manner has
an interest in the integrity of its picket line. "Picketing has tradi-
tionally been a major weapon to implement the goals of a strike
and has characteristically been aimed at all those approaching the situs
whose mission is .. . contributing to the operations which the strike
is endeavoring to halt."' 1  Picketing has been held to be consistent
with the public interest'0 2 except in those instances where it has
been used to achieve undesirable ends. 0 3  If the right to picket is
95. In the end the force which makes management and labor agree is often
an awareness of the costs of disagreement. The strike is the motive power
which makes collective bargaining operate. Freedom to strike, the threat of
a strike and possibly a number of actual strikes are, therefore, indispensable
parts of a national labor policy based upon the establishment of wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment by private collective
bargaining.
A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAW 98 (7th ed. 1969).
96. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
97. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
98. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
99. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
100. "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1970).
101. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964).
102. See Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953): "[I]t is
implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the
weapon of picketing."
103. NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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to be protected, its necessary corollary, the right .to dissuade others
peacefully from crossing the line, is likewise worthy of judicial
cognizance.1 0 4  A court compelling employees to cross a legal pick-
et line infringes op this interest; nonstriking employees so enjoined
can respect the line only by risking contempt sanctions.10 5 A court
of equity cannot cavalierly ignore this important national and per-
sonal interest.
However, the court must also recognize that while the picketing
union certainly has the right to dissuade persons from crossing its
line and doing business with the struck employer, an individual not
predisposed to honor a union picket line may not be coerced into
such a stance. The courts and the NLRB should act to protect the
antipodal interest, the individual's right to cross. To pose the coun-
terargument, when the refusing-to-cross union bargained with its
employer for benefits in exchange for promises, including a no-strike
promise, it may be deemed to have waived its right to be dissuaded
from crossing a picket line surrounding the employer's premises.
It could be argued that members of the refusing-to-cross union, by
voluntary contract, have designated themselves as persons predis-
posed not to honor the line-persons who have a protected interest
in being permitted to cross the line. The employer, as promisee,
should be allowed to obtain enforcement of that interest in the ju-
dicial forum.
The picketing union's interest in dissuading is certainly no greater
than the non-striking union's contractually based interest in crossing.
Thus a court order compelling the refusing-to-cross union to abide
by its contract, while it infringes upon the picketing union's interest
in the integrity of its line, does so consistent with the national
policy of enforcing voluntary agreements.
To alter the perspective slightly, it can be said that the right to
picket involves a set of legitimate expectations which are worthy
of judicial respect. The picketing union may legitimately expect to
be allowed to parade peacefully before the primary situs, but not to
be permitted to mass picket, to block ingress or egress, or to use
104. Of course, the countervailing interest of restricting labor disputes to the
primary situs and to the primary work of an employer proscribes even peaceful
secondary pressure by picketing, as evidenced by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. The
Act thus conforms to "the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor
organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor
disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in con-
troversies not their own." NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
105. For a recent discussion of contempt and its limitations in the Boys Markets
context, see North American Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 512 F.2d 238 (6th
Cir. 1975).
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violent means to isolate the primary employer from business inter-
course. A picketing union may legitimately expect to be allowed
to refuse to cross.'0 7 Until the scope of the no-strike undertaking
but may not expect a free hand in peacefully dissuading employees
of independent contractors whose work is "unrelated to the day-to-
day operation of the primary employer"10 6 from dealing with the pri-
mary employer. The no-strike promise, it might then be argued,
adds the non-striking union members to the class of individuals
which the picketing union has no legitimate expectation of being
able to dissuade from crossing. A court should not respect an in-
terest in contract-breaking. The conclusion is, then, that an order
compelling the non-strikers to cross the line does not derogate any
legitimate expectation involved in the right to strike and picket.
What this counterargument ignores is that it is not at all clear
that members of the refusing-to-cross union have agreed not to re-
spect another union's picket line. This is especially true in those
situations where the express terms of the agreement protect the right
to refuse to cross. 07 Until the scope of the no-strike undertaking
is determined by some tribunal on the merits-and the appropriate
tribunal would be arbitral because the parties have assigned the
initial determination of the scope of that undertaking to the arbitra-
tor-it is not apparent whether the picketing union lacks a predomi-
nant interest in or legitimate expectation of dissuading these indi-
viduals from crossing its line. A court must be wary of trampling
on the picketing union's tools of industrial combat protected by na-
tional labor policy.
Moreover, refusing-to-cross employees themselves may have a
protected right to make that refusal which would be placed in
jeopardy by a court order compelling a traverse of the line. Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act1°8 protects the right of an
employee to refuse as a matter of principle to cross a picket line
at his employer's place of business,' ° 9 and the Labor Board has con-
106. Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 679 (1961).
107. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, National Master Freight Agreement art. 9 (June 28, 1973),
reprinted in BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 30:1
(1975). To the contrary, an express clause requiring all employees to cross all picket
lines might support a different analysis. None of the refusal-to-cross cases dis-
cussed above concerned such a clause. Such a clause may be as difficult for an
employer to obtain as the express "no-no-strike" clause suggested by the Court in
Gateway Coal as the only way to negate an implied no-strike promise. Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 373 (1974).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
109. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
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sistently upheld that right." ° This right may of course be waived,
but such waiver must be in clear and unmistakable language. No
presumption of waiver is applicable in determining whether by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement employees have relin-
quished a right protected by the Act."'
A court must also recognize the practical realities of the economic
struggle which has occasioned the litigation. 1 2  The employer
seeking an injunction is engaged in a battle of economic strength
with the striking union. He has the right to continue his business
if he can." 3  The strikers, on the other hand, have the right to at-
tempt to close that business and thereby pressure the employer to
accede to their demands." 4  An obvious pawn in this struggle is a
110. See, e.g., Keller-Crescent Co., 89 L.R.R.M. 1201 (NLRB May 2, 1975).
Note also that the Act, in section 8(b)(4), contains an express proviso against
making unlawful any "refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are
engaged in a strike .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). While by its terms the
proviso does not apply to the situation at hand, it does indicate a congressional
recognition of the historical reluctance on the part of unionized workers to cross
picket lines.
111. In Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (Nov. 3, 1975) the Seventh Circuit enforced a Labor
Board order finding that an employer who discharged clericals for refusing to
cross a picket line had violated, inter alia, section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The clericals
had agreed to a broad no-strike promise, but with an arbitration clause limited to
differences as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the agreement.
Since the contract contained no clause expressly waiving the right of employees
to refuse to cross picket lines, the court held that the refusal-to-cross was not an
arbitrable grievance. Since the no-strike undertaking was interpreted to be as
broad as the arbitration clause, the court further held that the "refusal to dis-
honor another local union's picket line [was] not . . . subject to the no-strike
provisions." Id. at 288. The court distinguished Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545,
UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974), on the basis that the arbitration clause in-
volved there covered "any local trouble of any kind." Gary Hobart, supra at 288.
The court's analysis in Gary Hobart is inconsistent with a presumption of arbitra-
bility in disputes involving section 7 rights. The implication is that refusal-to-
cross cases might be viewed differently when the issue is a possible waiver of section
7 rights or injunctive relief to compel employees to cross picket lines in possible
derogation of those rights.
112. "The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic
and general propositions of law which nobody disputes." Vegelahn v. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
113. He may, for example, seek to replace the strikers. See NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333.(1938).
114. Chief Justice Warren said in the context of an employer free speech issue,
"[A]n employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to asso-
ciate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 . . . ." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). Under modem labor practice this mutuality of rights
during economic battle normally mandates judicial abstention-the result of excessive
intervention under the common law on behalf of capital against labor. See, e.g.,
H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS, ch. 1 (1968).
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non-striking union; if its members cross the line and work, the em-
ployer may be able to continue operations notwithstanding the
strike.11 5 The pawn may, in certain cases, be a queen.
If a court enters this arena at the behest of the employer, it
may well determine the outcome of the economic struggle between
the employer and the legally striking union.' 6  Even if only psy-
chologically (psychology is a potent factor in such economic wars),
the court has certainly affected that struggle. "Such a result is
wrong, not because we can be sure that the [picketers'] cause is
just . . . but because the judicial power has been used prematurely
and unfairly to aid one party to a private dispute."'"1 Admittedly,
the employer is merely asking the court to enforce bargained-for
promises in support of a preferred dispute-resolving mechanism.
Nevertheless, the employer is motivated primarily by purposes ex-
traneous to the contractual provisions before the court, i.e., the de-
sire to bolster its power position vis-h-vis the striking union. There
is nothing censurable about this purpose, but it clearly has little
to do with the rationale underlying Boys Markets: the strengthen-
ing of the arbitration process as the central national strategy for in-
suring labor peace. Courts should be wary of taking sides in a peace-
ful economic struggle by supplying new weapons to one side."'
The court does not do this in a standard Boys Markets situation,
since the injunction affects both parties to the dispute and, in any
case, merely specifies the use of a means previously agreed upon for
resolving conflicts. But in the refusal-to-cross situation, this mu-
tuality does not exist. The interests of the striking union receive
no representation in the court's processes.
V. A QUESTION OF ORIENTATION
In addition to their failure to consider the new interests involved
in the refusal-to-cross situation, courts have infrequently recognized
115. This assumes, of course, the availability of workers-new employees or super-
visor replacements-to replace the strikers, and the independence of the employer's
business from others, such as deliverers of supplies, who are disinclined to cross the
union picket line. Conversely, if the other union does not cross, the odds against
the employer's ability to continue operations are measurably increased.
The discussion herein is meant to be suggestive, not all-inclusive. If the picket-
ing union represents all production and maintenance employees and the other union
represents clericals or technical employees, the latter's crossing or refusing to cross
may have only a marginal effect on the employer's ability to continue operations.
116. As Frankfurter and Greene noted 45 years ago, the labor injunction "em-
ploys the most powerful resources of the law on one side of a bitter social struggle."
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 81 (1930).
117. Aaron, Labor Injunctions in State Courts, Part II, 50 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1158
(1964).
118. Cf NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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that Boys Markets is not simply a template of rules to be laid atop
the facts of the refusing-to-cross situation. 9 Justice Frankfurter's
words are particularly instructive: "No such mechanical answers
will avail for the solution of this non-mechanical, complex problem
in labor-management relations." 120 The substantive law to be ap-
plied in suits under section 301 must be federal law "fashion[ed]
from the policy of our national labor laws" with appropriate "judi-
cial inventiveness."121 This common law emphasis in federal labor
law is disserved by immutable rules and mechanical tests.1 2 2  Judi-
cial myopia must give way to creative "judicial insights that are
born of further experience' under the regime of Boys Markets.
23
Thus, a court applying "the traditional considerations of eq-
uity, 1 24 must take care to accommodate these additional legitimate
interests and national labor policies found in the refusal-to-cross
situation (e.g., the protected interests of the two adversaries and
the refusing-to-cross employees, and the national policy of avoiding
judicial interference with an economic struggle). This does not nec-
essarily imply that the injunction remedy must be shelved in the
judicial closet whenever a complaint bespeaks a labor injunction.
To the contrary, once these interests have been clearly identified
119. One court which did so recognize, in circumstances analogous to Boys
Markets, is the First Circuit. Chief Judge Frank M. Coffin in Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Teamsters Local 633, 511 F.2d 1097 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3205 (Oct. 6, 1975), faced with what he termed a "tempest . . . in a very small
teapot," found general principles of equity insufficient to support a court injunc-
tion to enforce minor employer work rules in the face of employee work stoppage
protests. A court must hesitate before taking sides in such an issue, especially
where evidence of irreparable injury is not easily divined. See text accompany-
ing notes 68-70 supra.
120. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
121. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, 457 (1957).
122. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's words in 1854 are enlightening:
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, instead
of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive provisions, and
adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases, which would be-
come obsolete and fail, when the practice and course of business, to which
they apply, should cease or change, the common law consists of a few broad
and comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and en-
lightened public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the
particular cases which fall within it .... [A] consequence of this expansive
character of the common law is, that when new practices spring up, new
combinations of facts arise, and cases are presented for which there is no
precedent in judicial decision, they must be governed by the general princi-
ple, applicable to cases most nearly analogous, but modified and adapted
to new circumstances, by considerations of fitness and propriety, of reason
and justice, which grow out of those circumstances.
Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267, 268 (1854).
123. Amalgamated St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302 (1970).
124. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 373 (1974).
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and evaluated, a court may well determine that injunctive relief
which maximizes the competing interests is appropriate.
A. Suggested Procedural Innovations
Turning momentarily from substance to procedure, the court's
equitable resolution of the dispute in the refusal-to-cross situation
will be facilitated by investigating a possible joinder of the picket-
ing union in the injunction suit. Although typically that union may
be aware of the struck employer's legal strategies, no court has re-
quired that notice be formally served or that the picketing union be
joined as a party.
The legally striking union may qualify as a necessary party un-
der rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Rule 19 is
a practical rule, focusing on pragmatic considerations rather than
the abstract and theoretical."'' 25  As a "person" whose interest in
the integrity of its picket line will be seriously and detrimentally af-
fected by a court injunction, the picketing union has "an interest
relating to the subject of the action."'126  A court order compelling
the non-strikers to cross the picketing union's line will have a "di-
rect, immediate impact" on this protected interest.127  The mere fact
that the picketing union is not party to the collective bargaining
agreement before the court does not disqualify it as a necessary
party under rule 19(a). 8  It is certainly clear that "the disposition
125. Electrical Workers Local 498 v. Sonotone Corp., 77 CCH LAB. CAS. 10,939 at
19,153 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1975).
126. Rule 19(a) provides:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of pro-
cess and %Vhose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any
of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he
be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the
joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the
action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
127. Cf English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1972)
(white employees whose seniority might be adversely affected by order in employ-
ment discrimination suit brought by black employees against employer and union
are Rule 19(a) necessary parties); Smith v. American Fed. of Musicians, 46 F.R.D.
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (local union held necessary party in suit by ex-member under
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970),
to compel reinstatement after discipline by local union was upheld by defendant
international).
128. English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1972). On
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of the action in [its] absence may .. .as a practical matter im-
pair or impede [its] ability to protect [its] interest."'129 Once the
picketing union is found to be a necessary party, the district court
"shall order" it joined, 30 as "insurance that the ultimate goal" of
recognizing all interests and policies "is accomplished in the most
equitable and least disruptive manner possible."'
31
Even if the picketing union is not considered a necessary party,
the court, in the exercise of its general equitable powers, should
order the petitioning employer to give notice to the union of the
pendency of the litigation, thus affording it the opportunity to inter-
vene. If the picketing union thereupon refrains from seeking inter-
vention, it has waived any equitable right to be heard. 32  But if
the picketing union seeks to intervene, it should be allowed to do so
as a matter of right. 33  As the age-old maxim says, "Equity de-
lights to do justice, and that not by halves."
An employer should recognize the advantage of having the pick-
eting union before the court. Questions may arise, as they did in
Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 53,134
concerning potential violence on the strike line if the court mandates
a return to work. The picketing union would of course deny such
censurable intentions. As a party to the action, the picketing union
would be covered by the court's injunction; disobedience could re-
sult in a contempt citation.
At the same time, the picketing union's joinder would afford it
the opportunity to suggest to the court that its interests, protected
by national labor policy, be considered among the interplay of in-
terests before the tribunal. It must be remembered that in many
instances the refusing-to-cross union may not be a steadfast or dis-
interested advocate of the picketing union's interests before the
the other hand, this does not mean that the picketing union's absence requires dis-
missal as an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). See id. at 48. See generally
Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 113 (1968);
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1601 et seq. (1972).
In almost all cases service can be obtained on the picketing union, and jurisdiction,
based on section 301, is not destroyed by its being joined as a party. Cf. NLRB v.
Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). See generally 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
19.13[2] (2d ed. 1948).
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
131. English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1972).
132. Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
133. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129
(1967).
134. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d
1222 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd per curiam, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1975) (No. 75-565); cf. note 61 supra.
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court. Refusing to work is costly for a union; its members lose
wages over someone else's issue. It has been suggested that pan-
union solidarity is on the wane,' especially in this era of double-
digit inflation and severe unemployment. It is not an unreason-
able conjecture that a court order compelling its members to cross
the line may be precisely what the refusing-to-cross union desires.
In such a situation, the picketing union's most reliable advocate
is itself. Its inclusion among the parties to the litigation, while
perhaps creating "a three-ring donnybrook,"' 36 may be the only way
to insure a full presentation of all interests affected.
Even if the picketing union abjures intervention-and it may do so
to decrease its exposure to a contempt citation-the court must none-
theless take into consideration the national labor policy supporting
the peaceful right to strike when it fashions its relief. To ignore
the existence of a legally picketing union in weighing the interests
before it is to do justice by "halves"; the half left out-the striking
union's right to respect of its picket line-is an interest protected by
statute and national policy.
B. An Historical Perspective of a Limited Institution
Another factor affecting the appropriate judicial strategy in the
refusal-to-cross situation is the historical background of the labor in-
junction. Memories of the abuse of this ultimate remedy are etched
deeply into the psyche of the American labor movement. It cannot
be gainsaid that the labor injunction employed as a weapon at the
behest of management was, and may continue to be, a dysfunction
in the labor relations system. 3 7  Specific performance of an em-
ployment contract is an extraordinary remedy indeed. Although an
opera singer may be restrained from singing for anyone else, the
court will not order her to sing for the petitioner, let alone to sing
well.'38
Judicial reticence in granting labor injunctions should be the
norm. 139  That much of the Norris-LaGuardia Act certainly with-
135. Raskin, Is the Picket Line Obsolete SATURDAY REVIEW, Oct. 19, 1974, at
12.
136. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 210 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
137. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
138. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.26, at 933 (1973).
139. Judge Green in Plain Dealer Publishing Co., recognizing that the court was
dealing with an extraordinary remedy, noted that the Boys Markets Court had directed
district courts to "take into account the general equitable considerations and the pub-
lic interest as pertinent thereto." 520 F.2d at 1230. "Injunction is an equitable
remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a
clear and plain case." Id. The equitable factors addressed by Judge Green involved
[Vol. 26:178
LABOR INJUNCTIONS
stands the Boys Markets onslaught. 140  The effectiveness of the in-
junction as the most powerful civil instrument of court policy de-
pends upon judicious use of the remedy. The "esteem of the courts
upon which our reign of law depends" is "undermined" by "the
administration of law by decrees."'14' As the extreme remedy, in-
junctions should be reserved for use in exceptional circumstances.
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate,
which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound dis-
cretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the is-
suing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that
never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commen-
surate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the in-
jury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by
the potential for violence in a court order compelling employees to disregard their
"tradition" and cross a picket line. Id. at 1230-31. While it is certainly true that
a court should not act in disregard of life and limb, it must also be wary, especial-
ly in the labor situation, of self-serving assertions in this regard.
140. Although the Boys Markets Court "harmonized" Norris-LaGuardia with
section 301, it did not contemplate judicial repeal of the statute. The applicable
requirements of Norris-LaGuardia, therefore, must be satisfied in ruling on an appli-
cation for a Boys Markets injunction. See Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 456 F.2d 483 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972). But cf Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972, 975 n.7 (7th Cir. 1973). Section 8 of
Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970), requires the complainant to have pursued
.every reasonable effort to settle [the] dispute . . . by negotiation [and] with the
aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation [and] voluntary arbitra-
tion." Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50
(1944). While it is true that the employer must have sought, and be willing to pursue,
"voluntary arbitration" as a condition precedent to injunctive relief, no court apply-
ing Boys Markets has required that the statutory prerequisite of mediation through
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or analogous state agencies be met.
Even though such mediative strategies may clearly be futile, the statute mandates
that the employer make "every reasonable effort." See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Food Drivers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Likewise, Norris-LaGuardia section 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970), requires
judicial determination whether "public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection." In
a situation such as Plain Dealer Publishing Co. where the employees assert their
desire to cross but interpose a fear of resulting violence, the availability of police
protection is a relevant factor in the court's calculus. Cf Detroit Newspaper Pub-
lishing Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communications Workers
of America, 456 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1972).
There appears to be no reason why section 10's call for an expedited appeal to
the circuit court, 29 U.S.C. § 110 (1970), should not also be followed in the Boys
Markets case. For a well-reasoned decision applying Norris-LaGuardia procedures
to a Boys Markets injunction, see Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 516 F.2d 242
(3d Cir. 1975).
141. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200 (1930).
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the protecting preventive process of injunction: but that
will not be awarded in doubtful cases, or new ones, not
coming within well established principles; for if it issues
erroneously, an irreparable injury is inflicted, for which
there can be no redress, it being the act of a court, not of
the party who prays for it. It will be refused till the courts
are satisfied that the case before them is of a right about
to be destroyed, irreparably injured, or great and lasting
injury about to be done by an illegal act; in such a case the
court owes it to its suitors and its own principles, to admin-
ister the only remedy which the law allows to prevent the
commission of such act. 42
It is therefore significant that if the employees fail to cross and
an injunction is denied, an employer may not be left without re-
course. It might hire replacements who will cross. 143  It can pursue
contractual damage remedies through the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 144  If these rem-
142. 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1431 (Wright ed. 1958) (quoting Justice Baldwin sitting at circuit in 1830).
143. See note 49 supra. In Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, enforced
sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the Board
held that although employees engage in protected concerted activity when they
respect a picket line established by other employees, employee replacement or dis-
charge would be upheld "where it [was] clear from the record that the employer
acted only to preserve efficient operations of his business, and terminated the services
of the employees only so it could immediately or within a short period of time replace
them with others willing to perform the scheduled work." Id. at 1547. The dis-
charge must be for an overriding employer interest and may not be punitive. In
determining the existence of this interest, the Board has required the balancing of
the opposing rights of the employer and the employees. A mere showing that
someone else may have to do the work is insufficient. The business need of the em-
ployer to replace employees must clearly outweigh the employees' right to engage in
a protected activity to justify an invasion of statutory rights. Overnite Transport,
154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1965); cf. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48
(1972). This standard has been consistently applied in refusal-to-cross cases. See,
e.g., Keller-Crescent Co., 89 L.R.R.M. 1201 (NLRB May 2, 1975); Smith Transit,
Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local 657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d
204 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a comprehensive study on NLRB handling of refusal-to-
cross cases, see Haggard, Picket Line Observance as a Protected Concerted Activity,
53 N.C.L. REV. 43 (1974).
144. Cf. Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, 77 CCH LAB.
CAS. 10,919 (3d Cir. June 10, 1975); General Dynamics Corp. v. Shipbuilding
Workers Local 5, 469 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1972). An arbitrator may be wary of finding
that the no-strike pledge covered the refusal-to-cross situation because of the import
of NLRA section 7 and the protected right of employees to honor a line in the ab-
sence of a clear waiver. See discussion at text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
The employer's difficulties in the arbitral forum may be increased if, in bargaining
with the union, it sought unsuccessfully to obtain an express "cross-picket-line"
clause. Other fora have viewed ill-fated attempts to broaden the no-strike clause as
evidence that the existing clause does not cover the situation. Compare Gary Hobart
Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263
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edies are unavailable, it can seek damages in federal court under
section 301.14' All of these factors must be weighed before grant-
ing injunctive relief. 46
C. The Necessity of Establishing Irreparable Injury
Flowing from judicial appreciation of the injunction as a special
remedy is the necessity of paying careful attention to the issue of ir-
reparable injury. The inquiry must proceed on a case-by-case
basis 47 and must not be perfunctory. Review of the Boys Mar-
kets progeny indicates that although the district courts typically
make at least passing reference to the necessity of finding irrepa-
rable injury, 48 they too often recite litany without supportive facts. 149
(Nov. 3, 1975) and Kellogg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 948 (1971) with NLRB v. Rockaway
News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) and Hearst Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. 1405 (1966).
145. See Rhode Island and M. Associates v. Local 99, Operating Engineers, 88
L.R.R.M. 2007 (D.D.C. 1974); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Workers Union,
84 L.R.R.M. 2741 (M.D. Ga. 1973), affid on other grounds, 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir.
1973); cf. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 238 (1962). Moreover, the pendency of a
meritorious damage claim against the union is an effective stimulus to union "reason-
ableness" on other matters. It is difficult to assess whether this strategy is a viable
substitute for a court order compelling a union to cross a picket line. But this dis-
cussion of alternative remedies is not intended to show that the other tools are just
as effective as a labor injunction. The point is, rather, that an employer is not left
totally defenseless when faced with a refusal-to-cross. A court should be wary of
adding to this arsenal in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
146. Empirical study is required to support the argument that an employer has
viable alternative strategies available to continue its operations in the refusal-to-cross
situation. But, in any case, the appropriateness of injunctive relief is not determined
solely by estimates of how effective the alternative strategies are in the particular
litigation before the court.
It might also be noted that the Boys Markets Court rested its decision on a be-
havioral assumption unsupported by empirical study, i.e., that employers would not
agree to arbitration clauses if they did not receive a specifically enforceable no-strike
promise in return. Indeed, under the brief regime of Sinclair Refining, about 94%
of 1717 major collective bargaining agreements contained arbitration clauses despite
the absence of specifically enforceable no-strike promises. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, MAJOR COLLECTIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PRO-
CEDURE 5 (Dept. of Labor Bull. No. 1425-26, 1966). Apparently employers did
agree to arbitration clauses in the absence of a specifically enforceable no-strike
clause.
147. For example, if the production and maintenance unit is striking, the clericals
refuse to cross, and the resulting injury is the failure to get some letters typed, that
injury can hardly be considered irreparable. On the other hand, if the clericals were
assembling production material requests and failure to transmit those requests
promptly would result in indeterminate delays in material procurement, a claim of
irreparable injury might be supported.
148. Contra, General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1798, 333 F. Supp. 331 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971) (no mention of irreparable injury at all).
149. See, e.g., Holland Constr. Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 315
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that the district
court "set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action" in support of interlocutory in-
junctive relief. The Court of Appeals should vacate an injunction
granted with insufficient specification.150
As an evidentiary matter, mere assertions of disaster are no sub-
stitute for proof of irreparable loss. The court must distinguish
between injury caused by the failure to cross and injury caused by
the legal strike. Only evidence of the former is relevant. The in-
jury caused by the strike in general, although perhaps irreparable,
is not a sufficient cause for injunctive relief.'
F. Supp. 791, 792 (D. Kan. 1970) (boilerplate language that "picketing or strike
will cause irreparable injury to the employer"). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Teamsters Local 633, 511 F.2d 1097 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3205
(Oct. 6, 1975) (refusal of employees to comply with a mandated safety precau-
tion held to constitute irreparable injury if it seriously undermined an employer's
ability to conduct his business).
150. See, e.g., McCord, Candron & McDonald Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1822,
464 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1972); cf Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typo-
graphical Union No. 18, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
967 (1972) (preliminary injunction vacated because "the District Court announced
only a bare conclusion as to irreparable harm and failed to make findings of fact to
support this conclusion"). "There must be a . . . separation of the meritorious
sheep from the capricious goats." Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d
859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
151. Some of the better discussion concerning factors constituting irreparable
harm can be found in analogous cases under the Railway Labor Act. For example,
in Ozark Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Mo. 1973), a
refusal-to-cross situation, the court noted:
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer substantial and
irreparable injury if the relief sought is not granted. It will lose customers
to other modes of transportation and to other airlines, unless service is
resumed. The public interest in the interruption of service of an interstate
carrier is of primary concern to the courts and is sufficient irreparable damage
for an injunction to issue. Damages cannot be accurately estimated as to
Ozark's loss of identity as a carrier, loss of routes to other carriers, loss of
customers permanently, and general loss of good will of the public.
The NLRB General Counsel, in a memorandum authorizing Regional Directors to
act on requests for temporary restraining orders in certain section 10(0) cases without
prior clearance from Washington, offers illustrations of irreparable injury for the
guidance of the Regions: (1) substantial financial loss, if uncollectable from the
respondent or if combined with other indicia; (2) substantial impact on national de-
fense, cf. Boire v. Local 295, Plumbers, 59 L.R.R.M. 2694 (M.D. Fla. 1956); (3)
picketing or strike conduct which presents an imminent threat of bankruptcy or
insolvency, loss of a business relationship, substantial unemployment or a substantial
loss of business or customer good will, cf. Kaynard v. Independent Routemen's
Ass'n, 479 F.2d 1070, 1073 (2d Cir. 1973); (4) violence of mass picketing, cf. In re
Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild Local 225, 476 F.2d 856, 857 (Ist Cir. 1973); (5)
dangerous consequence of a work stoppage; (6) threatened spoilage of perishable
goods, cf. Samoff v. Longshoremen Local 1694, 188 F. Supp. 308, 311 (D. Del.
1960); (7) serious adverse impact upon the community, cf. Hoffman v. ILWU
Local 10, 85 L.R.R.M. 2353, 2354 (9th Cir. 1974); (8) time of the essence; (9) situa-
tions posing serious remedial problems in Board litigation, cf. Dauds v. Anheuser-
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VI. A STRATEGY OF ACCOMMODATION
The refusal-to-cross situation can be distinguished from the
typical Boys Markets cause in one final important way, and that
distinction gives rise to a suggested judicial strategy. In the typi-
cal Boys Markets case the granting of an injunction does not con-
stitute a determination of the merits of the underlying dispute.
1 52
Enjoining a refusal-to-cross, on the other hand, unavoidably en-
tails a judicial ruling on the matter in issue; the court implicitly
decides that the union has bargained away its prerogative to re-
fuse to cross. Moreover, once a work stoppage is enjoined, its
resumption after arbitration is unlikely.1 53  Functionally, such an
injunction may therefore mean that the employer's interpretation
of the agreement has prevailed. Even though the arbitrator may
subsequently find no contract violation in the union's actions, the
court's injunction has, in a practical sense, mooted the issue.
The Supreme Court has generally sought to avoid prejudging on
the merits issues appropriately reserved for the arbitral process. In
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 54 a suit to compel arbitration, the Court avoided deciding the
employer's assertions on the merits by applying a presumption of ar-
bitrability. The employer had argued that subcontracting mainte-
nance work was a management prerogative under the bargaining
agreement's management rights clause. If the contested conduct did
fall within the management rights provision, not only would the
matter not be arbitrable, but there would be no contract violation on
the merits. The parties, however, had bargained for use of an arbi-
trator to settle this type of dispute. To avoid a judicial determination
on the merits, the dispute was sent to arbitration, so that the arbitra-
Busch, Inc., 28 L.R.R.M. 2377 (D.N.J. 1951). This memorandum might serve as a
helpful checklist for district courts in the refusal-to-cross situation. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Memorandum No. 75-18 (April 22, 1975).
152. It is true that the court order enjoining the stoppage of work, applying the
required presumption of arbitrability, in effect decides the merits of any union
claim that the no-strike promise does not cover the situation at bar. The court,
however, does not decide the underlying contract dispute.
153. Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability,
85 HARV. L. REV. 636, 641 (1972). Frankfurter and Greene quote the testimony of
Eugene V. Debs before the United States Strike Commission investigating the Pull-
man strike of 1894: "[Ihe ranks were broken, and the strike was broken up . . . not
by the Army, and not by any other power, but simply and solely by the action of the
United States Courts in restraining us from discharging our duties as officers and
representatives of the employees." F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 17 (1930). The authors later submit that "the suspension of strike
activities, even temporarily, may defeat the strike for practical purposes and foredoom
its resumption even if the injunction is later lifted." Id. at 201.
154. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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tor, clothed with a mantle of expertness by Supreme Court pro-
nouncement, might work his magic.'55
In the refusal-to-cross situation the tables are rearranged, but
the thrust of that policy-a judicial respect for the parties' intent and
the recognized limitations of the judicial institution-is equally appli-
cable. To send the question of whether the no-strike clause has
been breached to an arbitrator while enjoining the strike as a vio-
lation of the no-strike pledge decides the issue, i.e., the scope of the
no-strike clause, squarely on the merits. 56 This, the Court has said,
is not its job. 5 7
A court does, however, have an appropriate, albeit limited, role
to play at the request of an aggrieved employer. 58  Applying the
presumption of arbitrability, it should order arbitration of the em-
ployer's complaint against the refusing-to-cross union if it finds the
contractual duty to cross to be an issue arguably within the param-
eters of the arbitration clause. Merely because the union claims a
right to cross (even where a protection-of-rights clause indicates the
union is probably correct in its assertion), arbitration should be re-
quired "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbi-
tration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the
. . . dispute."' 59  If the arbitrator determines that the union is vio-
155. Likewise in United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960), the Court mandated the forwarding of even frivolous grievances to
arbitration because of the "therapeutic" and "cathartic value" of the process.
156. Judge Fairchild, dissenting in Inland Steel, noted that "to enjoin in the
present case is not to prevent substitution of a strike weapon for the arbitration
procedure agreed upon, but to presume that recognition of a picket line has been
forbidden by the contract unless and until an arbitrator rules that it has not." Inland
Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
157. Only in a duty of fair representation case has the Court strayed from the
policy of deferring to the arbitral forum. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-77,
190-93 (1967).
158. Of course, if the employer asserts, as did the plaintiff in NAPA Pittsburgh,
that the picket line is secondary in nature, the court should certainly require as a
prerequisite that the employer pursue its remedies before the Labor Board under sec-
tion 8(b)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). A secondary boycott charge is
required by statute to be given expedited treatment by the Labor Board and upon a
finding of "reasonable cause to believe such charge is true," the Labor Board
"shall" petition for injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970). Injury caused by
failure to cross an illegal secondary picket line is not only irreparable, it is self-
imposed.
159. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960).
A refusal-to-cross has almost uniformly been held to be an arbitrable matter.
See, e.g., Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d 137 (10th Cir.
1970); Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. 965 (1972); Amalgamated Lace Operative,
54 Lab Arb. 140 (1969); New England Master Textile Engravers Guild, 9 Lab. Arb.
199 (1947).
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lating its no-strike promise and has waived the protected right of its
members to refuse to cross, he may order the employees to cross the
line. Such an order may be sufficient to effect a resumption of
work.1 60  If the arbitrator's action by itself is insufficient, the em-
ployer can move for court enforcement of the award.
61
But doesn't this strategy also infringe upon the picketing union's
interest in dissuading nonstrikers from crossing its line? It certainly
does, but it does so as a necessary accommodation of conflicting
interests perfectly consistent with national labor policy as developed
in the labor equity forum. Boys Markets demonstrates that "ac-
commodation" is a necessary adjudicatory principle in this area.162
This strategy does not initially involve court anti-strike action; until
the culmination of the arbitration the nonstriking employees may
respect the picket line without court sanction. 63  The arbitration
process, which is what the Boys Markets Court intended to support,
is permitted to function. The section 7 rights of the employees to
refrain from crossing a picket line are likewise protected pending a
definitive arbitration award which finds those rights to have been
waived. If that finding is made, the picketing union's interest in
having its line respected by the nonstriking employees must become
inferior to the nonstriking employees' contractually expressed inter-
est in crossing the line in order to uphold the national labor policy
favoring promise keeping. The arbitrator has placed members of
160. The author was among counsel in such a situation in September, 1973.
When the court refused to enjoin the refusal-to-cross, the parties at the court's sug-
gestion moved expeditiously to arbitration that same afternoon. Arbitrator James
Healey of the Harvard Business School, after a hearing, ordered the union to cross
the line and resume work, which it did the following day.
161. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Shipbuilders Local 5, 469 F.2d 848
(1st Cir. 1972). The court's role in reviewing the arbitral award is limited to as-
certaining whether the award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). This is not to suggest that a judicial rubber stamp is in
order; "the arbitrator's authority to render a given award is subject to meaningful
review." Torrington Co. v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir.
1966). Merit questions are not open for rethinking, but "power" questions cer-
tainly are. In addition, the court must review questions of procedural fairness and
misdealing. Cf. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
154 (1968); United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970).
162. 398 U.S. at 249, 250.
163. The Court may establish a precise and expedited timetable for the arbitra-
tion order in order to mitigate the costs to both the employer and the refusing-to-
cross union members, who are, as noted above, not being paid while they stand
outside the line. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 373 F.2d
136 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Ma-
chinists Lodge 143, 185 F. Supp. 129 (D. Minn. 1960); cf. Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 77 CCH LAB. CAS. 10,938 (3d Cir. June 13, 1975) (six-month limit set on
section 10(0) injunctions).
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the refusing-to-cross union in the category of persons "unable to be
dissuaded" from crossing. When the court subsequently enforces
the arbitration award, it is not preempting the arbitrator, but rather
enforcing his award. All private interests and public policies are
thereby accommodated and the court has not prematurely taken
sides in the external economic struggle.
VII. ONE FINAL LOOK
Applying the suggested strategy to the earlier hypothetical situ-
ation of a refusal-to-cross,16 4 a court addressing the Company's ap-
plication for injunctive relief should determine whether, applying
the presumption of arbitrability, the dispute concerning Local 10's
refusal to cross Local 50's line is an arbitrable matter. The no-
strike provision encompasses, at least arguably, some implied re-
quirements concerning crossing picket lines. Since it is a
controversy over the application or interpretation of the terms of the
agreement, the refusal-to-cross is arbitrable.
A court following Monongahela would end its inquiry at this
point and an injunction would issue. A court adhering to the
Amstar rationale would have already found that the refusal-to-cross
was not "over" a pre-existing dispute and denied injunctive relief.
But neither of these simplistic approaches will suffice. "The nature
of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevita-
bly involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a
quick, definitive formula as a comprehensive answer.'" 65  That
"evolutionary process" has demonstrated that the court must weigh
the legitimate interests of the adversaries in the primary dispute, the
possible protected interest of the refusing-to-cross employees, and
applicable national labor policies in working through the equity
equation.
At the very least, the court should require that notice of the ac-
tion be given to Local 50 to afford it an opportunity to defend its in-
terest in the equity forum. The court should then order expedited
arbitration of the refusal-to-cross issue, perhaps establishing a set
timetable, and retain jurisdiction to consider enforcement of a sub-
sequent arbitral award if necessary and appropriate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under Boys Markets an employer may be entitled to obtain an
injunction in federal court when a union disavows contractual prom-
164. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
165. Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).
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ises and strikes over an arbitrable matter. Courts which have dealt
with the refusal-to-cross issue, however, have failed to recognize
that labor relations involve a full spectrum of inherently conflicting
interests and policy pronouncements and that labor peace and in-
dustrial welfare depend upon actualization and reconciliation of
these variables.
The courts must act by reason and not by rote. The issue before
them is a difficult one and there are no easy answers. No single pol-
icy standing alone, whether the right to strike, the support of arbitra-
tion as the core strategy for dispute resolution, or labor peace,
necessarily determines the proper court action.
All rights tend to declare themselves to the logical ex-
treme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which
the particular right is founded, and which become strong
enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached.1
66
This point has been reached when courts are asked to apply Boys
Markets to the refusal-to-cross situation. Injunctive relief which
maximizes and accommodates all legitimate interests and policies is
certainly appropriate, but it is a matter of the first importance that
courts go through the process of acknowledging the conflicting in-
terests and policies before employing this ultimate remedy.
166. Holmes, J., in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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